



DNSP Perspective on Pricing Principles under Draft Rule

AEMC Public Forum on Draft Determination




Kelvin Gebert, Regulation and Network Strategy

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


Some Observations

Vic Energy Forecasts




Vic Demand Forecasts



► Trend is variable

- › Population growth corridors maintaining demand growth
- › The AEMO forecasts are reflected in trends across established communities

Topographical Demand Growth



Objectives for Tariff Reform



In our view these are

▶ **Fairness**

- › Pricing arrangements do not equitably allocate costs on a 'cost to serve' basis

▶ **Dis-incentivise inefficient network bypass**

- › Cross-subsidisation leads to energy choice decisions which may be inefficient compared to network provided energy
 - And the network cost is not mitigated

▶ **There is a need to recognise efficient new technology solutions**

- › At the network fringe, stand-alone energy solutions may be more efficient
 - Networks should be able to optimise the service provided to customers

▶ **Pricing should align to an altering service paradigm**

- › The definition of customer cannot be stereo-typed as an energy 'consumer'
 - The network may be better described as part of a customers energy solution
 - The attributes of network include supply security, stability and sharing
 - The value of these broader benefits needs to be captured in the service model

▶ **Retail tariffs should reflect DNSP pricing intentions**

Proposed Pricing Objective

▶ **Clause 6.18.5 (a)** (draft)

- › The network pricing objective is that the tariffs that a Distribution Network Service Provider charges in respect of its provision of direct control services to a retail customer should **reflect the Distribution Network Service Provider's efficient costs of providing those services** to the retail customer.
 - The AEMC describes the objective as having a cost reflectivity focus
 - 3 key components of cost reflectivity are identified by AEMC (see next slide)
 - which form the basis of the pricing principles

▶ **General Comment**

- › Guidance via an over-arching objective is supported
- › The components of cost reflectivity described help give it meaning
- › Translating this understanding to the proposed Pricing Principles is more challenging

Components of Cost Reflectivity

1. Sending efficient signals about **future network costs**
 - This is the LRMC component
 - Important in areas of the network with sustained growth
2. Allowing a DNSP to recover its regulated revenues so that it can recover its efficient **costs of building and maintaining the existing network**
 - The amount of revenue recovered from each tariff to reflect total efficient costs of providing services to the assigned customers
 - Allocates on basis of maintenance & safety investment as well as LRMC
 - An important cost allocation principle, helps overcome cross-subsidisation
3. Each consumer should pay for the **costs caused by its use of the network**
 - The AEMC identifies this with cross-subsidisation between tariff classes
 - We take this to support cost allocation relevant to
 - the customers chosen package of network services
 - geographic / demographic cost to serve
 - In our view, innovative pricing, such as a premium for network service insurance where customer is relatively energy self-sufficient would be consistent with this concept

Proposed Pricing Principles



▶ Each tariff must be based on LRMC

- › The network expansion driver is demand, hence LRMC logically expressed as \$/kW
- › LRMC dependent on demand growth forecast, this is typically low
 - For much of the network LRMC makes a negligible contribution to the tariff
 - Method and approach in adopting LRMC will influence outcome
 - A uniform methodology and guidance would be preferable
- › Customers must be able to understand and respond to the LRMC pricing signal
 - It is not apparent that this condition can apply other than in Victoria
 - Dependence on interval metering
 - especially if customer understanding is a requirement
 - We query whether implementation in the short term is practicable
 - DNSPs required to base prices on LRMC from 2017
 - It is unclear how pricing structures will develop, how AER will determine conformance with the Rules and whether the outcomes will be acceptable to the jurisdiction

Proposed Pricing Principles

► Revenue expected to be recovered from each tariff

- › Must reflect efficient costs of serving assigned customers
 - Cost allocation geographic differentiated (consistent with LRMC implementation)
 - Distortion to LRMC signal to be minimized. Questions:
 - Using a demand component for recovery of residuals appears to be in conflict
 - As does use of an energy component, which is a proxy for demand
 - We conclude that a significant fixed component may be necessary

Brattle Paper
Table 23
“Introduce 3 Part
Tariff, No Bill Change
for Small Customers

				Charges:	Fixed	Demand	Variable
Tariff components					150 to 400	75.00	0.03
Units					\$/year	\$/kW/year	\$/kWh
Customers (% of total)	Annual consumption (kWh)	Peak demand (kW)	Total annual bill (\$)	LRMC Components of the bill (\$)			
10%	3,000	4	542.31	150.00	300.00	92.31	
30%	6,500	4	900.00	400.00	300.00	200.00	
10%	10,000	4	1,007.69	400.00	300.00	307.69	
10%	3,000	8	842.31	150.00	600.00	92.31	
30%	6,500	8	1,200.00	400.00	600.00	200.00	
10%	10,000	8	1,307.69	400.00	600.00	307.69	
Average revenue per customer (\$/yr)			1,000.00				

Proposed Pricing Principles

▶ Minimise impact on customers

- › Two key factors noted in the draft Rule – have regard to:
 - customer choice of tariff
 - It is not clear what the objective of choice would be in the proposed framework
 - Provision is not apparent
 - Should not be synonymous with avoidance
 - extent to which customers can mitigate impact via usage decisions
 - LRMC basis is required
 - Usage decisions will only influence outcomes in high LRMC geographic areas
 - Yet cost allocation may impact low LRMC geographic areas

Conclusions

- ▶ **A LRMC pricing basis may be overly constraining in the projected energy environment of flat demand**
- ▶ **A clearer ability to base tariffs on ‘total efficient costs of providing services to the assigned retail customers’ is preferable**
- ▶ **With changing use of the network, greater flexibility in tariff setting is necessary**
 - › Tariffs will remain consumption based, whereas the networks are developing a broader connectivity role for mixed generator / consumer customers, and provide an insurance service
 - › Broader transparency of cross-subsidisation inherent in tariffs is necessary so that DNSPs can co-optimize network and localised energy solutions
 - › There is a growing urgency for retail tariffs to directly reflect the DNSPs pricing intentions