
*Review of Investment Signals
in the NEM
and the implication for the
Reliability Standards*

Reliability Panel review is timely coming as it does at a time where

- ↳ Reserve Margins in SA and Vic have been lower than the target
- ↳ NEMMCO ANTS analysis shows less investment than is required to maintain reserve margins
- ↳ Growing concerns regarding the reliability settings
- ↳ Completion of analytical review

Examination Focus

- ✎ What level of investment will the current market settings deliver over the next 10 years?
- ✎ Will that investment deliver sufficient capacity to meet the reserve margins into the future?
- ✎ If not, what market settings should be changed to improve the outcome?

Study Approach

- ✎ While focused on SA-VIC, analysis covers all of NEM
- ✎ Determined new entry costs in each region (based on full “merchant plant” investment criteria)
- ✎ Simulated future spot market prices
- ✎ Given that investment and market behaviour is influenced by risk instruments, modelling incorporates both market and contract revenue
- ✎ Results consider commercial viability and new investment levels compared to load growth and reserve margins

↳ PLEXOS

- ↳ Chronological Linear Program model
 - 1 hourly basis
- ↳ Comprehensive representation of:
 - Generator performance and operating costs
 - Forced and maintenance outages
 - Transmission constraints
 - Fuel costs
 - Hydro inputs limitations
 - Fixed bids only for generators with fixed operational patterns
- ↳ Convergent Monte Carlo simulation

Prices

- ↪ Average price
- ↪ Price duration curves

Interconnector flows

- ↪ Total flows
- ↪ Flow duration curves



Generator dispatch

- ↪ General behaviour
 - Service hours / number of starts
 - Capacity factor



Model Verification



(SA-VIC price duration curves)





Model Verification

(Heywood and SNOVIC flow duration curves)




Investment Modelling

- ↳ Market model run for a decade
- ↳ Most viable investment taken first and price outcome modified
 - ↳ additional investments made if an adequate price premium still exists
- ↳ Only gas plant investments are considered



New Investment

Annual Bulid by Technology






Regional Demand vs New Entry


(New Entry Vs Demand Growth)

Regional Load Growth - Regional New Generation






Resulting Supply-Demand





Post Investment Curves

South Australian Price Duration Curves



Modelling Observations

- ↳ Insufficient new investment to meet demand growth
 - ↳ reserve margins fall significantly
 - ↳ levels of USE increase although insufficient iterations to quantify the 0.002 USE levels
 - ↳ NEMMCO ANTS delivered a similar outcome
- ↳ beyond 2012 is less certain
 - ↳ transmission constraints
 - ↳ new entrant costs
 - ↳ bidding strategies and portfolio responses
 - ↳ excessive new entry in the regions where investment is “cheapest”

Market Environment

- ✎ Any ongoing mismatch between reliability expectations and the market settings aiming to deliver investment is of concern
- ✎ Some change to the market setting appears to be required – preferably changes that:
 - ↪ can be incorporated into the existing market structure;
 - ↪ are clear and simply applied;
 - ↪ minimise the risk of market intervention;
 - ↪ provide clear investment signals; and
 - ↪ drive efficient market outcomes.

- ↳ Higher price caps (VoLL, CPT)
- ↳ Standing Reserve Offers (continuous reserve trader)
- ↳ Loss Of Load Expectation (LOLE) escalator
- ↳ Co-optimised Capacity market

Higher Price Caps

- ↳ VoLL only affects price in rarely and in unpredictable instances
- ↳ These instances can have significant cost impacts
- ↳ Frequency of occurrence not always related to total installed capacity
- ↳ Would prompt a consequential review of CPT
- ↳ Increased VoLL will change sensitivity of all participants to contracts
 - ↳ generators could be expected to be more cautious about the level of contracts they offer
 - ↳ retailers could be expected to more carefully cover their expected purchases to manage higher risks
 - ↳ very difficult to model what will be a behavioural change

Standing Reserve Offers

- ↳ Standing offer should provide sufficient certainty to encourage investment and could operate on either:
 - ↳ an acceptable price threshold or
 - ↳ a given reserve level
- ↳ Existing Reserve Trader
 - ↳ demand side contracts are available to improve reliability
 - ↳ short term, non-continuous and limits ability of parties to commit resources
- ↳ Standing Reserve Trader:
 - ↳ can be applied and funded regionally
 - ↳ is highly visible to participants and stakeholders
 - ↳ could operate with reserve margins and reliability standards as currently defined

Improved Price Signals

- ✎ LOLE would put a surcharge on market prices when reserve levels low
- ✎ Co-optimised available reserve market would be an addition to ancillary services
- ✎ LOLE or a co-optimised available reserve market would:
 - ✎ enhance market signals to fund necessary levels of reserve plant
 - ✎ encourage forward capacity contracting for new capacity and DSP
 - ✎ complex impact on spot and contract markets

Overall Impact on Prices

- ↳ The measures to encourage additional investment may increase the cost to service customer demand
- ↳ The measures generally do not simply add costs, but impact the dynamics of the market
- ↳ Overall effect on prices would be small and the minimum necessary to efficiently deliver the reliability required
- ↳ Impact on the market will be more severe if done through intervention

The Planning Council's analysis shows:

✎ Current market setting DO encourage investment, but that investment is:

Too little and too late to achieve the reliability targets

✎ This mismatch of investment and reliability is only modest and any market correction should be proportionate

✎ However, without any market correction we face:

↳ Increased reliability risks; and

↳ The likelihood of non-market intervention